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Abstract 
This paper aims to suggest a new arrangement of Plato’s dialogues based on a 
different theory of the ontological as well as epistemological development of his 
philosophy. In this new arrangement, which proposes essential changes in the 
currently agreed upon chronology of the dialogues, Parmenides must be 
considered as criticizing an elementary theory of Forms and not the theory of so-
called middle dialogues. Dated all as later than Parmenides, the so-called middle 
and late dialoguesare regarded as two consecutive endeavors to resolve the 
problems drawn out in there; an effort in the theory of knowledge through 
Theaetetus, Meno and Phaedo and another in ontology through the second part of 
Parmenides, Sophist and Republic. 
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Introduction 
There are many determinative factors regarding the chronology of the dialogues 
about which our informationis terribly deficient. There is no certain evidence about 
the date of each of the dialogues, nor any reliable information about the beginning 
and ending time of Plato’s writing. The most determinative issue among all 
chronological matters, I am inclined to insist, is the question that if did Plato use to 
manipulate or, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus said (1808, 406), polish, comb and curl 
his previously written dialogues and, if so, to what extent?
1
That there is almost no 
answer to this most crucial issue shows how far deficient, indefinite and inconclusive 
the chronological plans can be.
2
 The fact that we do not even have enough 
information to decide, in case of Socratic dialogues, to what extent they are reporting 
or reflecting the actual dialogues of historical Socrates, and to what extent they are 
Plato-made stories so that even now we have a schizophrenic character between 
Socrates and Plato, can be good evidence for this deficiency. There are, nevertheless, 
somemore certain informations that can be contributive in case of the arrangement of 
some dialogues. 
a) The only external evidence provided by Aristotle that Lawswas written after 
Republic (Politics, II, 6) which was repeated by others
3
. 
b) Few internal evidences provided by references in dialogues themselves including: 
i) the cross references in the Sophist 217a and Politicus 257a and 258b which 
indicate the prior composition of Sophist; ii) Timaeus 27 which hints to Critias as its 
sequel; iii) Theaetetus 183e where Socrates says he met Parmenides when he was 
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young which has been taken as a reference to Parmenides; iv) a similar reference to 
the discussion of young Socrates with Parmenides this time in Sophist 217c; v) 
Sophist 216a refers to a previous discussion which has been thought to be referring to 
Theaetetus, and vi) the Timaeus 17b-19b in which Socrates tries to summarize his 
previous dialogue about the structure of cities, and the kind of men these cities must 
bring up to become the best people and so on which, among the dialogues we have 
now, must refer to Republic. 
 
1. An onto-epistemological chronology 
 These few internal and external references are not of course sufficient to offer 
an arrangement among more than thirty dialogues. In such a poor situation about 
information and the possibility of later manipulation of the dialogues, it seems the 
best criteria of presenting a chronology, if it can be possible at all, should be those 
which are the most fundamental on the basis that what is more fundamental must be 
the subject of change at last. Now, what kind of criteria can be chosen for an 
arrangement better than the ontology and the epistemology of the dialogues?  
Since the arrangement I am going to suggest here is to be based on the onto-
epistemological status of the dialogues,I shall call itthe Onto-Epistemological 
Chronology of the Dialogues (OECD). Although it is, of course, more of a 
philosophical chronology than a style-based one, while trying not to violate both the 
referential and stylometric evidences, it does not focus on other features of the 
content of the dialogues. In fact, the arrangement that is suggested here comes closer, 
I believe, to the evidences. Nonetheless, it is still a revolutionary chronology, not 
only in its main differences with other chronologies in respect of the place of some 
key dialogues, but also in its formulation of the whole corpus. Whereas I am not to 
divide the dialogues into different periods as all the various chronologies are used to 
do, I classify them in different groups I call "waves"; a name I borrowed from Plato 
himself. When he gets to the theory of philosopher-king in Republic, he calls it the 
biggest wave which must be overpassed: 
 
I have now come to what we likened to the greatest wave (κύματι).4 (473c6-7) 
 
As each problem is like a wave for Plato that he has to overpass, each wave of 
dialogues focuses on resolving a main problem.Plato’s philosophy can best be 
imagined as anocean. That his philosophy is as widespread, vast and deep as an 
ocean, maybe more than any other philosophy during all the history, is something 
that many would agree upon. It is not, nonetheless, the great and glorious character of 
his philosophy which is the intention of this poetical resemblance, but the characters 
of the waves of an ocean. Plato’s dialogues can best be divided to groups that behave 
like waves. Like each group of his dialogues, a wave in theoceanhas a pushing force, 
a rising path, a high point and a fall. Each wave, independently identifiable, makes 
the movement of another wave possibleand so the next wave has the power of its 
previous waves leading it to go forward to do the same for its next wave.This 
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interwoven character of dependence-independence of each wave is what I have in 
mind about Plato’s dialogues. Each group/wave of dialogues has a pushing force, a 
problem or paradox that is to be resolved in its way by some new theories and 
methods. The wave, thus, rises upward making both the problem and the need of its 
solution as radical as possible until it gets to the highest point by resolving the 
problem and getting to thefavourite results. Nevertheless, no solution is completely 
acceptable in Plato’s philosophy and there are always new problems and issues. 
Therefore, every wave has a fall that can be the starting point of the next wave.The 
suggestion of waves of dialogues saysindeed that Plato’s dialogues cannot be treated 
altogether by taking all the dialogues as a whole nor each of the dialogues singly and 
independent from all the other dialogues. The best is to treat couples of them as a 
chain that though is somehow independent has a special relation with couples of 
other dialogues.I distinguish four waves in Plato’s dialogues as follows. 
i) Socratic Wave including: Alcibiades I, Alcibiades II, Apology, Clitophon, Crito, 
Hippias Minor, Lysis, Menexenus, Republic I, Theages, Laches, Charmides, 
Euthyphro, Hippias Major and Parmenides I.
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ii) Epistemological Wave including: Protagoras, Gorgias, Euthydemus, Theaetetus, 
Cratylus, Meno andPhaedo. 
iii) Ontological Wave including: ParmenidesII, Sophist, Timaeus, Philosophos 
(Republic 473-541)  
iv) Political Wave including:Politicus, Ideal State (Republic357-473), 
Laws,Epinomis, Critias. 
Besides some maybe dubious or at least less important dialogues, I dismissed 
Philebus, Phaedrus andSymposiumfrom taking part in this chronology. In spite of 
some obvious resemblances with the dialogues of the ontological wave especially 
Timaeus, both in its ontological approach and even in its stylometric features, 
Philebus cannot be emplaced in the overall project of the waves. The onto-
epistemological chronology, to be honest, is unable to read Philebus in Plato’s corpus 
as I think none of the other chronologies could get at an acceptable explanation of its 
relation with the other dialogues. We have problems also to emplaceSymposium 
andPhaedrus in our plan. They seem to belong, nevertheless, more to the period 
between the epistemological and ontological waves or even coexistent with some 
dialogues of the latter wave.Phaedrusin which we are encountered with probably last 
serious echo of theory of anamnesis,
6
 on the one hand, shows its close connection 
with Meno and Phaedo while its presenting of the method of collection and division, 
on the other hand, associates it to Sophist and Politicus. Contrary to most of the 
scholars who date the Phaedrus quite late in Plato’s career7 and afterSymposium, 
Moore (1973) insists on the converse relation of the two dialogues taking Phaedrus 
as earlier.
8
 Whatever their relation might be, the similarities between the two 
dialogues besides their incompatibility with the epistemological and ontological 
waves may call for a different wave. 
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Except the first wave, of the order of its dialogues we discuss below, the 
dialogues of all the other three waves are arranged chronologically. When a dialogue 
is located after another dialogue and before a third one in the epistemological and 
ontological waves, it means that either its epistemological or ontologicalstatus, is 
between those dialogues. The case is the same about the order of the dialogues 
between different waves, except the last wave in which the order of the dialogues of 
the political wave must be considered parallel to, or interwoven with, the dialogues of 
the ontological wave. 
 
a) Socratic wave 
The first and longest wave, includes a) a group of ten dialogues (ordered 
alphabetically): Alcibiades I, Alcibiades II, Apology,Clitophon, Crito, Hippias Minor, 
Lysis, Menexenus, Republic I, Theages, b) a second group of four dialogues:Laches, 
Charmides, Euthyphro,HippiasMajor, and c) the first part of Parmenides. I 
distinguish these last five dialogues from all the other ones which are called Socratic
9
 
dialogues ordered alphabetically. Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro and Hippias 
Majormust be considered, without chronological order between themselves, after the 
Socratic dialogues and before the first part of Parmenides. It is not difficult to guess 
how surprising it looks for the reader to sea the first part of the Parmenides here in 
the first wave after Socratic dialogues and before all the other ones. This is the most 
revolutionary suggestion of OECD. 
The leading problem of the wave is historical Socrates’ problem of acquiring 
knowledge reshaped by Plato in Socratic dialogues. It is this problem that leads to the 
theory of Forms in the Socratic dialogues and especially in Laches, Charmides, 
Euthyphro, Hippias Major and Parmenides I. While Hippias Major (301b2-6) 
criticizes the onto-epistemological grounds ofSocratic dialogues, Parmenides 
Icriticizes the theory of Forms as it is formulated in them. I agree that there is not 
enough material in there to be called a 'theory' of Forms to be criticized in 
ParmenidesI, but where else can such a theory be found?
10
The poor discussion of the 
theory in the early dialogues is the main reason that,as far as I know, noone has 
suggested that ParmenidesI is criticizing the theory of Forms of the early dialogues 
by now. As we will discuss below, the theory of Forms in those dialogues isindeed 
constructed in a way to escape those attacks. 
 
b) Epistmological wave 
This wave includes a) Pratogoras,Gorgias and b)Euthydemus,Theaetetus, 
Cratylus
11
, MenoandPhaedo.While I guess that Gorgias is probably later than 
Protagoras, I cannot be certain about their relation with the other six dialogues that 
are chronologically arranged.
12
 I called this wave epistemological because I believe 
that it includesPlato’s epistemological endeavor to solve the epistemological problem 
arisen in Parmenides I (133b-135a). 
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The backbone of this wave, however, is Plato’s epistemological project from 
Theaetetus to Phaedo where 1) by the distinction of knowledge and true opinion, (a) 
the epistemological problems of the early dialogues are resolved and (b) the 
epistemological ground for the theory of Forms is provided (cf. Tim. 51d3-5); 2) by 
the doctrine of anamnesis, the method of hypothesis and the theory of Forms as 
causes, the epistemological problem resulted from the separation of the Forms and 
their participant as it had been drawn out at Parmenides 133b-135a, is resolved. The 
epistemological wave includes, thus, some essential modifications in Plato’s theory 
of knowledge to save the theory of Forms as well as to solve some of the 
epistemological problems of the early dialogues. This means that this wave is an 
epistemological project, a doctrine that may not be accepted by some scholars. 
Charles Kahn, for instance, thinks that in what he calls the 'series of dialogues from 
the Meno to the Phaedrus', not only is not any sign of linear development, in which 
different epistemological theories replace each other, but 'different concepts of 
knowledge are used in different contexts for different purposes' (2006, 130). 
Although the epistemological wave does not say that there actually is a unique 
theory, it emphasizes the unity of a project or process. Moreover, some kind of a 
linear development from Theaetetus to Republic through Meno and Phaedo can be 
recognizable, but not a development of replacing different theories but a development 
of theory that gets enriched and more sophisticated. The complicated epistemological 
theory of Republic as is construed in the allegory of line can reasonably be taken as 
the development of the theory of the distinction of knowledge and belief in 
Theaetetusand Meno.  
 
c) Ontological wave 
The four dialogues of Parmenides II, Sophist, Timaeus, Philosophos
13
construct 
the ontological wave.These four dialogues have in themselves Plato’s brilliant 
endeavor to solve the following problems by presenting a new ontology: 
i) Theontological problems of the early dialogues which was itself the ontological 
aspect of the problem of false belief
14
 needed a change of approach to being. This 
shift was doneby accepting the being of not being based on the creative theory of 
'difference'that is initiated in Parmenides II and attains to its fulfillment in Sophistand 
Timaeusand is used inTimaeusandPhilosophos. 
ii) The problems of participation (131a-e) and Third Man (TM) (132a-b,132d-133a) 
in Parmenides Ithatareresolved by the new theory ofbeing inSophistand the new 
theory of Forms inPhilosophos. 
The ontological wave, therefore, is to make Plato’s main modification in his 
understanding of being that results in the refutation ofParmenides’ principle and 
Plato’s achievement to a new notion of being that cannot be the subject of the 
previous problems, neither the problems ofHippiasMajor(301b2-6) norParmenides I. 
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4. Political wave 
This wave is not chronologically separated from the ontological wave but gets 
along it as a somewhat synchronous wave. Although the dialogues of this wave, 
Politicus, Ideal state
15
 (RepublicII-V), Laws, Epinomis and Critias are arranged 
chronologically after one another, their dates can be neither before nor after the 
ontological wave, save the publication of Laws which is almost certainly the last one 
of all the dialogues and after Plato’s death. Politicus was certainly written after 
Sophist and probably before Ideal state which itself must have been composed before 
both the Laws and Timaeus.Epinomis, if it has been written by Plato himself that is 
strongly dubious, must be dated after the composition of Laws. The order of the 
dialogues of the two ontological and political waves, considered together, must be 
something like this: Parmenides II, Sophist, Politicus, Ideal state,Laws 
(composition),Epinomis, Timaeus, Critias, Philosophos/Republic, Laws (publication). 
The overall scheme of Plato’s dialogues based on our arrangement of them is drawn 
in scheme 1 below. 
 
Scheme 1. Waves of Dialogues 
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The development of Plato’s philosophy based on our onto-epistemological 
investigation will be something like scheme 2 below. Plato who had started the 
Socratic wave with Socrates’ search of knowledge as the motivating force of the 
wave provides a theory of Forms thatis referred to in dialogues like Laches, 
Euthyphro,
16
 Charmides and Hippias Major. This theory is the very theory which 
Allen (2013) calls the 'earlier theory of Forms'; a theory that, as Allen argues (ibid, 
67ff.), cannot be identified with thetheory of Forms presented in the dialogues of the 
so-called middle period. The onto-epistemologicalgrounds of these dialogues turn out 
as problematic in Hippias Major (301b2-6), as the theory of Form turns out to be 
problematic in the first part of Parmenides. Here is the first and biggest turning point 
of Plato’s philosophy where based on those critiques, he tries to reconstruct his 
philosophy by changing the epistemological and ontological principles of his 
philosophy.  
The first effort is an effort in the theory of knowledge. In spite of the problems 
related to the false belief in Euthydemus and Theaetetus, knowledge turns out to be 
distinctfrom opinion in Theaetetus. This is, I think, the main goal of Theaetetus.
17
 
This distinction provides the epistemological grounds for the theory of anamnesis 
and the method of hypothesis in Meno andPhaedo, theories that are to resolvethe 
epistemological problem ofParmenides. Since besides the ontological aspect of the 
problem of false belief, the problems of participation and TM are still annoying not 
received their answers in the epistemological wave, the ontological wave tries to 
resolve them. 
These problems made Plato launch another wave, this time trying to change the 
theory of being. The starting point of the wave is the second part of theParmenides 
where the Parmenidean notions of being and unity are to be attacked. This attack has 
at least three important results: i) separating oneness from being in Parmenides’ 'One 
Being', ii) accepting that ParmenideanOne and Being are problematic and finally iii) 
introducing the notion of 'difference'. Plato makes use of these results in Sophist, 
TimaeusandPhilosophos.The points (i) and (ii) lead in Sophist to the rejection of 
Parmenidean absolute being and provides a new relation between being and 
difference which makes resolving the problem of false belief possible.The new 
relation of being and difference helps to resolve the problems of participation and 
TM. Therefore, at the end of the ontological wave, the onto-epistemological 
problems of the early dialogues and the problems of the theory of Forms in 
Parmenides are all resolved. The development of Plato’s thought based on our thesis 
is shown in Scheme 2 below. 
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Scheme 2. Plato’s Onto-Epistemological Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now it is time to defend the place of the dialogues that made the main changes 
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2. Parmenides I
18
 
The place of Parmenides in the current chronologies is the cause of many 
problems. Not only the problems of Parmenides I, on the one hand,cannot be 
correctly appliable to the middle dialogues, butthere are problems either to observe 
its problems as invalid or valid. The main problem out of the place of Parmenides in 
the current chronologies, generally speaking, is that theycannot provide a consistent 
story of Plato’s development in which Parmenides can have its deserving role. By the 
new place of this dialogue in OECD, we are not only to make the story consistent, 
but to dedicate the most prominent role to the dialogue. All Plato does in the so-
called middle and late dialogues is going to be interpreted in OECD as Plato’s two 
efforts in the theories of knowledge and being to resolve the problems of Parmenides 
I. 
To set Parmenides I at the end of the early dialogues and before all the other 
dialogues is the most astonishing and, at the same time, the most vital decisionof 
OECD. In fact, what changes the current chronologies to OECD is a new story of the 
development of Plato’s thought based on the problems of the theory of Forms in 
Parmenides I.The new place of Parmenides in OECD can, I think, be explainedwell 
regarding what happens in the dialogues both before and after it. In relation to the 
other dialogues of the Socratic wave its place is so dramatic. Having challenged the 
Athenian interlocutors, Socrates (the wisest man of Athen),and his theory of Forms 
(the very instrument by which he used to refuse his interlocutors because they were 
not able to explain what a thing itself, i.e. the Form, is) are now the subject of the 
attacks of Parmenides, a non-Athenian, in almost the same way of  the 
dialogue.Respecting the dialogues after it, what is done in Plato’s other dialogues 
from Theaetetus to Phaedo in the epistemological and from Parmenides II to 
Philosophos in the ontological waves is nothing but Plato’s effort to reconstruct his 
theory of Forms with his new doctrines and methods in epistemology and ontology. 
The best reason for accepting OECD’splace forParmenides Iis what happened in the 
dialogues of both the epistemological and the ontological waves. 
i) There appears to be a problem about OECD’s place for Parmenides: where is that 
theory of Forms that is to be observed as the subject of Parmenides’ problems? Since 
it is as long as a history that we are accustomed to recognize Plato’s theory of Forms 
with what is suggested in Phaedo and Republic, it might then be wondrous to hear 
that Parmenides is criticizing the theory as it is in Euthyphro, Laches and 
HippiasMajor alongside some other Socratic dialogues and not as is proposed in 
Phaedo and Republic. First, if we mean by a theory a doctrine fully and completely 
'constructed',  I agree that there cannot be found such a theory in the early dialogues 
as it cannot be found anywhere else in the other dialogues as well. It is somewhat 
related to Plato’s way of introducing his theories but is more, I think, related to the 
theory of Forms itself. Comparing with the theory of Forms, the doctrine of 
anamnesis, for example, as it is introduced and articulated in Meno and Phaedo or, 
even more obviously, the method of hypothesis in Phaedo and Republic are far better 
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theorized and constructed. It shows that Plato was able to construct a theory of Forms 
in some of his dialogues instead of reminding the theory dispersedly here and there. It 
indicates, I think, that he was hesitant to theorize it from the beginning. It is not, 
therefore, reasonable to expect him to provide such a theory at the outset and in his 
early dialogues when he is wavering about it even at his much later dialogues.  
Second, besides Plato’s oral tradition, there actually exists a theory of Forms in 
the early writings- the dialogues which have been considered by OECD as earlier 
than Parmenides- if we do not expect a fully constructed theory. This theory which is 
called by Allen (2013) as the 'earlier theory of Forms', differs in some essential 
features from the theory of Forms as construed in some of the dialogues of the 
epistemological and ontological waves (the so-called middle period dialogues). 
While the 'earlier' theory has some features that make it vulnerable to the attacks of 
Parmenides, the theory of the so-called middle period dialogues tries to resolve them. 
The way in which the theory tries to resolve the problems is discussed in the next 
section below. Nonetheless, the main point is that the universal
19
 and unequipped 
Forms of the early dialogues turn to the Forms, which became much more equipped 
(by new theories) and even considered as paradigms (especially in Republic). 
 Thirdly, the naive and elementary way of discussing and defending the theory 
by young Socrates who is ready more to suggest different views than defending one 
firm and fixed theory, approves that there is no such theory yet. Thus, I take 
Socrates’epiphet, "young", in Parmenides as functional because Parmenides refers to 
it as a cause of the naivety of the theory (e.g., 130e, 135c-d).
20
   The critics of 
Hippias Major (301bf.), thirdly, can indicate how Plato did criticize his own theories 
in the Socratic wave. In spite of the fact that we cannot find anywhere in the 
dialogues before Hippias Major where Socrates be saying that he is cutting up things 
in words and so on, this attitude of Socrates is criticized in there. This shows that 
Parmenides’ critiques can be read in the same way and there may be no necessity of 
finding more than what we have about the theory of Forms in the written works of 
the Socratic wave. 
 
ii) Resolution of Parmenides’ problems in the middle period dialogues 
The chronologists’ biggest assumption that Parmenides’ objections must refer 
to the middle dialogues (e.g., Cornford, 1939, 70-71; Palmer, 1999, 180; Kahn, 1996, 
329) cannot be accepted because both the problems and their answers are already 
worked upon there (for example cf. Meinwald, 1992, 372; Dorter, 1989, 200). We are 
not to claim that Plato answers directly to the objections of Parmenides in the 
dialogues of the second and third waves for such answers cannot be found anywhere 
in Plato’s corpus even in his so-called late period dialogues. What we insist upon is 
that the epistemological and ontological grounds of the theory of Forms as is 
represented in the middle period dialogues is deliberately constructed so as not to be 
broken by those criticisms anymore. We suggest, thus, that not only Parmenides’ 
11 
 
problems are not referred to the middle period dialogues but they are intentionally 
resolved there.  
Of the six main objections, i) the problem of Forms for all, even worthless, 
things (130c-d), ii) the problems of participation (131), iii) the problem of TM (132a-
b), iv) the problem of considering Forms as thoughts (132b-c), v) the problem of 
Forms as paradigms (132d) and vi) the epistemological problems of taking Forms as 
separated from particulars (133a-135a), putting aside the first and the fourth, we 
consider the third and the fifth as one, the regress problem or the problem of TM. 
Since TM difficulty, it seems, arises from a certain relation between a Form and its 
participants, all the second, third and fifth problems have the same basis.Therefore, if 
it can be shown that a) the problem of participation and alsoTM problem and b) the 
epistemological problem are resolved in some of the dialogues of the middle period, 
OECD’s place for Parmenides will be better justified. 
 
1) Problems of participation and Third Man in the Republic 
Allen argues that though, for Plato, the just itself is just and the beautiful itself 
beautiful, this does not imply SP because for this, the function "… is F" must be 
applied univocally to F itself and F particulars. This univocal application of F to F 
itself and F particulars, Allen says, can be correct only if both of them 'have 
identically the same character' (1998, 58) which obviously is not the case. He points 
that for Plato, both in the early and middle dialogues, Forms are paradigms or 
standards, that is they are 'things characterized not characters' (ibid, 64) and Plato did 
not think of themin the way he used to in the early dialogues and as common 
characters.
21
 'Not only the regress arguments', he says, 'but all of the objections to 
participation in the Parmenides posit an identity of character between Forms and 
particulars' (ibid). The rejection of the identity of F in F itself and F particulars based 
on the theory of Forms as paradigms in the original-copy model is justified because 
Forms stand to particulars 'not as predicates stand to instances of predicates but as 
originals stand to shadows or reflections' (1961, 333 cf. 335). 
F. C. White thinks not only thatthe original-copy theorycannot be ascribed to 
all the dialogues of the so-called middle period dialogues  but also that it cannot be 
helpful in meeting TM
22
 (1977, 208). His reason is that if images are images at all, it 
is due to the fact that their properties are 'univocally in common with their originals' 
(ibid, cf.199). My own point of view is that while TM is not appliable to Republic, it 
is appliable to all the other so-called middle dialogues. I agree with White that i) 
there is no common theory in the middle dialogues about the nature of the relation 
between the Forms and their participants; ii) the original-copy model is not appliable 
to Phaedo
23
; iii) the original-copy model cannot be helpful regarding SP. 
Nonetheless, I absolutely disagree with him about its help to TM. What I think is that 
while Plato has always been committed to SP, he tried in Republic to present the 
original-copy model that is completely helpful against TM. Plato does not try to 
reject TM by rejecting SP as some think, but he tries to reject TM while maintaining 
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SP. Because of the difference between original and its shadow, the original-copy 
model of the theory of Forms, as Allen noted, escapes TM. The reason is that by this 
theory, the nature of participation changes in a way that the identity of a Form and its 
participants is not the case anymore. This ontology, amongst so-called middle 
dialogues I confine to Republic, changes the nature of participation so that neither 
Parmenides’ problem of participation nor TM will be appliable anymore. Not only 
does not it reject SP but it even strengthen it. It is primarily and completely the Form 
of F which is F; a participant’s being F must be understood in a different way.  
A paradigm of F is the perfect example of being F. The paradigm of F is not F-
ness but F itself. The difference between F-ness and F itself can become evident if we 
examin SP about them: While SP is correct and meaningful about F itself, it looks 
bizarre and unacceptable about F-ness. Large itself, the paradigm of Large, its perfect 
example, is obviously large because it is nothing but this being large and thus SP is 
obviously meaningful here. But about F-ness: 'Largeness is large' or 'beauty is 
beautiful' looks completely unacceptable because F-ness or the concept of F cannot 
itself be F. TM is also based on the assumption that Plato’s theory of Forms makes a 
Form necessary when there is a common thing between some things. It only by 
understands the Form of F as F-ness, a universal concept which is in common 
between a Form and its participants, that the necessity of the existence of what is 
common between them is followed. If Forms are not universal concepts but originals 
of which all participants are shadows, there will be no necessity for a third thing to 
represent the common feature. Therefore, Plato’s original-copy model of his theory 
of Forms changes the relation between a Form and its participants in a way that none 
of the problems of participation and regress arguments of Parmenides can be 
effective anymore. The case is different about Phaedo because the original-copy 
model and the theory of Forms as paradigms are not yet theorized there.
24
 
 
2) The Epistemological Problem 
Besides the distinction of knowledge and true belief which can clearly be 
helpful for the epistemological problem, Plato’s three famous doctrines, the theory of 
anamnesis, the method of hypothesis and the theory of Forms as causes, do 
substantially aim at solving the epistemological problem resulted from the 
chōrismōsbetween the Forms and their particulars.25 
a) While the first appearance of the theory of anamnesisin Meno (81) is not about 
Forms,it is Phaedo, however, where the epistemological function of the theory is 
straightly directed to the Forms. Allen’s view in linking between the theory of 
anamnesis and the 'epistemological problem entailed by the separation of Forms and 
particulars' worths noting. He thinks that if the theory is an answer to this 
epistemological problem, it is not reasonable to say that the theory in Meno is not 
directed to the problem (1959, 172). I admit Allen’s note that the difference of the 
theory of anamnesis in the Meno and Phaedo is that the theory in the Phaedo solves 
problems generated by a χωρισμός between Forms and particulars which Plato, 
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when he wrote the Meno, was perhaps groping for, but had not yet clearly formulated 
(ibid, 174). The prior knowledge of the Forms does obviously intend to solve the 
problem of knowing separated Forms. By this theory, our knowledge is not restricted 
to our own world anymore and it cannot be said, as is claimed at Parmenides 134a-b, 
that none of the Forms are known by us and thus the knowledge of Forms is not a 
problem any longer. They are not still in us and, therefore, do not have their being in 
relation to the things that belong to our world strictly as it is said at Parmenides 
133c-d. Consequently, the theory of anamnesis suggests a solution to the problem of 
knowledge of Forms while keeping them separated. The gap between Forms and 
things is as complete and huge as it is in Parmenides 133e. Here they are even more 
separatedthen ever. It is the big presupposition of many Plato’s commentators that he 
must have tried to diminish or eliminate the chōrismōs had he wanted to resolve the 
epistemological problem of Parmenides. Based on this presumption, Plato should 
have chosen the first and most simple way of solving problem. Thence we can see 
while the theory of anamnesis is so much obviously directed to the epistemological 
problem, no one tends to take it as a post-Parmenides thesis. 
b) As the doctrine of anamnesisis presented as a solution to Meno’s problem, the 
method of hypothesis is suggested as another solution to the problem (Meno 86d8-e5 
cf. 87a-b). The relation of the method with Meno’s paradox in the mentioned 
passages is obvious enough. Phaedo’s more complicated and better-constructed 
method which is not simply applying geometrians’ method as it was in Meno, but a 
more philosophical and specified one, is still related with the problem of 
investigating something that is out of the region of our knowledge. Socrates’ warning 
about the danger of watching directly an eclipse of the sun (99d-e) before discussing 
the method (100a f.) can throw light on this relation. Socrates who is searching for 
the causes is afraid of his soul completely being blind if he looks at things directly as 
someone who watches an eclipse of the sun might become blind in his eyes. As the 
one who wants to watch the eclipse must first see its reflection in water and similar 
things, Socrates who wants to find the aitiai, i. e. Forms, must use the hypotheses. 
Therefore, the method of hypothesis is to be, firstly, a method of getting the 
knowledge of the Forms (100a6). Immediately after the definition of the method at 
100a, its relation with Forms becomes apparent at 100b f. The use of the method in 
the allegory of Line in Republicis also related with the Forms, though, contrary to 
Meno and Phaedo, it has nothing to do with anamnesis. While this method is not 
used in the dialectical proceeding from images to sensible things and then to the 
mathematical objects, the hypotheses are needed to proceed from them to the Forms 
and then to the first principle. Socrates’ reference to the method of geometers saying 
'they make these their hypotheses and do not think it necessary to give any account of 
them, either to themselves or to others, as if they were clear to everyone' (510c6-d1), 
indicates his intention, i.e. using Forms in an epistemological construction which, 
though has knowledge as its result, is not forced to explain Forms themselves. This is 
strictly directed against the epistemological problems arisen in Parmenides 134a-c. 
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c) Phaedo’s theory of Forms as causes has clearly the epistemological function of the 
Forms as its purpose.The result Socrates gets to about the role of Forms in 
explanation, that only whatshares in a Form by its nature, refuses its opposite while it 
is itself, means that we can explain a thing not only by a Form but also by what 
always has its character (103e2-5). Everything that shares in a Form by nature is 
always called with that Form and can never be called by the opposite: It cannot 'admit 
that Form which is opposite to that which it is' (104b9-10). This helps him reach to 
some kind of necessary opposition between things that are not the opposites (105a6-
b1)  which enables him to extend his previous safe and foolish theory of explanation 
by Forms to  another not foolish but still safe theory of explanation (105b6-c6). 
Socrates’ effort to show how Forms, without themselves being the explanation, can 
help us reach to a safe explanation of things is against Parmenides’ problem (133c-
134a) that Forms cannot help to the knowledge of particulars. 
iii) That Plato wants to restart his search of knowledge in Theaetetus due to the 
previous arisen problems of knowledge in Parmenides I, is what was somehow 
agreed upon also in the other chronologies. In this respect, its place in OECD is the 
same, the beginning of a wave that is to resolve the problems of knowledge by 
redefining what knowledge is.The main step of the dialogue, I think, is the 
conclusion that knowledge is not true belief (187b ff.), nor true belief plus account 
(201d ff.) which has the distinction ofknowledge and beliefas its result. The vital role 
of this distinction for the theory of Forms is obvious enough from Timaeus 51d3-5: if 
understanding and true opinion are two kinds, then Forms must exist. 
ThatTheaetetusmust be posited after Parmenides is something almost all the 
current chronologies agree with. The difference is that OECD considers it as the 
starting point of an epistemological effort proceeding to Meno and Phaedo and thus a 
hopeful effort that gets to its own goals namely establishing the epistemological 
grounds for the theory of Forms. It is Theaetetus’ distinction of knowledge and true 
opinion that is restated inMeno (85c-d, cf. 97a-98b) which is related tothe case of the 
slave boy and the doctrine of anamnesis; a doctrine thathas the duty of resolving the 
problem of knowledge of the separated Forms in Parmenides I (133b-135a).This 
doctrine is reformulated in Phaedo (72e ff.) and gets to its, what we may be allowed 
to call, cosmological explanation in Phaedrus. The method of hypothesis has the duty 
of making us capable of getting the knowledge of what we do not know (Meno 
86ef.), the knowledge of particulars out of the hypothesized knowledge of the 
separated Forms (Phaedo101df.) and the knowledge of the separated Forms and the 
first principle out of the opinions we have of the sensibles (Republic510bf.). 
Therefore, the epistemological wave is a project of resolving the epistemological 
problem of Parmenides using the interrelated doctrines of the distinction of 
knowledge and belief, anamnesis and the method of hypothesis.The theory of Forms 
as causes in Phaedo can be interpreted in this way as well. 
ii) After the absence of the theory of Forms in Theaetetus
26
, Cratylus and Meno
27
, 
surprisingly we see in the other dialogues of both the epistemological and ontological 
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waves that Socrates asks his interlocutors to accept the existence of the Forms only as 
a hypothesis. At Phaedo 100b4-8
28
 after recalling that he has never stopped speaking 
about the Forms, Socrates says: 
 
I turn back to those often mentioned things and proceed from them taking as 
hypothesis the existence (ὑποθέμενος εἶναί) of the beautiful, itself by itself, 
and Good and Great and all the others. If you grant this and agree (ἃεἴ μοι 
δίδως τε καὶ συγχωρει ̑ς εἶναι ταῦτα) I hope to show you the cause….  
 
It is of the highest importance to ask why Socrates who used to take the 
existence of the Forms for granted in the early dialogues (e.g., Euthyphro 6d-e, 
Hippias Major 287, 289d, 292e, 294d, Laches 191e-192a)
29
now is demanding that 
we accept it only as a hypothesis?
30
 Is it not simply because their existence had been 
seriously attacked in Parmenides I? If we agree with OECD that the first part of the 
Parmenideshad been composed before such hypothesizings of Forms, it can be more 
understandable.  Now, what OECD says provides a more consistent story: solutions 
provided in those dialogues are purposely directed to the problems that had been 
drawn out before.  
iv) With OECD’s arrangement, we do accept that the problems of Parmenides were 
valid in Plato’s point of view and hence we are not subject of the objection IX. 
OECD is safe regarding the objection X since: 
a) Aristotle’s ignorance of Plato’s self-criticism as it is shown in Parmenides’ 
problems, are lot more understandable by OECD’s arrangement than by the theory of 
those who take the problems valid. Considering Parmenidesas prior to the dialogues 
like Phaedoand Republic,where the theory is discussed more than anywhere else, 
could make Aristotle’sinadvertence more understandable because  Parmenides goes 
farther
31
 from them in time and thus more negligible and  Plato’s Forms-defending 
dialogues of the two waves after the Socratic wave provides no room to doubt that he 
believes in his theory. Even if Aristotle, who never mentions any development in 
Plato’s thought, had seen Parmenides (something we are not sure about), he must 
have taken it either as an old dialogue without any significant importance because 
there was no sign of rejection in Plato’sactual way of treating with the theory or as a 
pedagogicdialogue. Whatever the relation of Aristotle and Parmenides might have 
been, having in mind Aristotle’s attacks against the theory of Forms, we can be 
almost sure that he did not see Plato as a self-criticizing philosopher. It might be the 
same about the Academy. 
V) None of the stylometric evidences agrees with the current place for Parmenides 
and the irregularities of Parmenides’ style regarding so-called late dialogues has 
always been surprising for many scholars. The case is totally different with OECD 
because most of thestylometric evidences show that Parmenidesis closer to the early 
or middle dialogues than the late ones. 
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3. Euthydemus 
I am not personally satisfied with OECD’s place for Euthydemus. It must 
probably placed after Parmenides I, maybe before Theaetetus or during the time 
between Theaetetus and Meno.From an epistemological point of view, its discussion 
of false belief belongs to the period that is engaged with the problem of false belief, 
that is, in OECD, between Theaetetus and Sophist. The problem of learning either 
what one knows or what one does not know (276d) resembles Meno’s paradox. 
Euthydemus, however, seems to be, epistemologically, close to Theaetetus and before 
it but ontologically prior to Sophist. The problems of the possibility of telling lies 
(283e), impossibility of false speaking (86c-d) and the paradox of knowing or not 
knowing (293c-d) all belong, epistemologically, to the period of the Theaetetusand 
Meno. Moreover, the definition of knowing as having knowledge (ἔχειν 
ἐπιστήμην) at 277b9-c1 can be considered as related with the same theory at 
Theaetetus 197b1 and prior to the distinction of having and possessing knowledge 
that follows it.  Nonetheless, Euthydemus has neither any clear discussion of the 
distinction of knowledge and belief nor of the theory of Forms. All these can allow us 
to consider it epistemologically close to Theaetetus and prior to it
32
. Futhermore, this 
place does not affect the currentattitudes insofar as they consider it either as an early 
or transitional dialogue that is prior to Meno. The difference is then about its place 
regarding Parmenides I and Theaetetus. 
 
4. Theaetetus and Sophist 
Both the current chronologies and OECD agree upon positing Theaetetus after 
Parmenides, but they differina) the place of Parmenides and b) Theaetetus’distance 
fromSophist. By bringing Parmenides to an earlier period while keeping 
Sophistcloser to the place it had before, the OECD’splan make a long distance 
between Theaetetus and Sophist consideringat least MenoandPhaedoin between. Here 
are our proofs for this arrangement: 
i) We believe thatMeno’s discussion of the distinction of knowledge and opinion 
(97a-b, 97d-98b) must be posterior to Theaetetus’ distinction (187bff., 201dff.) 
simply because while it is demonstrated in the latter, it is only used in the former. 
Phaedo highly resemblesMeno and, as it isgenerally agreed, belongs to the same 
period. 
ii) MenoandPhaedointend to resolve a) the problem of false beliefas it was drawn out 
in Euthydemus and Theaetetus and b) the epistemological problem of ParmenidesI, 
both epistemologically. The interrelated doctrines of the distinction between 
knowledge and opinion, anamnesis and the method of hypothesis try to solve those 
problems by a new theory of knowledge. Sophist, on the contrary, intends to deal 
with the problems ontologically. While the theory of anamnesis explains how we can 
have such a thing as true belief distinct from knowledge, which itself is kind of 
resolving the problem of false belief, it cannot explain how false belief can 
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ontologically be possible because it needs that the being of not being be accepted 
first, a thesis that is not accepted before Sophist. We also noted thatbesides the 
second part of Parmenides, Sophistcannot be later than Republic because it is in 
Sophistthat the being of not being is accepted before to be used in Republic. Now, a 
careful consideration of this fact besides the above discussion of the epistemological 
mission of Theaetetus, Meno and Phaedo to resolve the problems of (a) and (b) 
epistemologically, lead us to the important result that these last three dialogues,being 
unable to resolve the problems ontologically, tried to present epistemological 
solutions.This means that they were prior to the Sophist-Republic solutions because 
the ontological solution does not require the epistemological solution. OECD seems 
to be, therefore, right to make the epistemological wave prior to the ontological one. 
An evidence of this is the absence of the theory of anamnesis in Republic. Why it 
never appears in there? Mentioning the myth of Er at 619bff.and the later incarnation 
at 498d as evidence, Kahn (2006, 130) thinks that 'something like' anamnesis is 
actually presupposed in Republic. Nonetheless, he agrees that it does not appear in an 
epistemological context. Our question, nonetheless, is exactly about the absence of 
the epistemological role of the theory in Republic. Kahn (ibid) thinks that the 
omission of the theory in Republic is not because Plato changed his mind about 
knowledge. He notes that at 518c Plato is clearly a kind of innatist. Having the 
allegory of Cave in mind, his suggestion is that it has some rhetorical and artistic 
instead of conceptual and philosophical reasons. He thinks that the theory does not fit 
with exactly the same part of the Republic we departed as Philosophos, i.e., from the 
end of the book V to the end of the book VII. I hope my discussion about Plato’s 
development can show why the theory is not needed anymore in Republic. This is an 
onto-epistemological and thus, contrary to Kahn, a philosophical reason. The 
omission of the theory in Republic is simply because by the new metaphysics 
suggested in the mentioned books of Republic, there is no need to the theory of 
anamnesis anymore. The classification of being and knowledge as it is drawn in the 
allegory of Line and the dialectical search of knowledge from the lower classes to the 
upper ones which is itself based on Republic’s specific theory of hypothesis can 
provide the knowledge of Forms without having them before, i.e. without anamnesis. 
iii) What is the reason for consideringSophist immediately after Theaetetus? What is 
the reason for considering Theaetetus with Sophist, Politicus and Parmenides as 
Eleatic dialogues as, for instance, Dorter (1994) does except that their characters are 
from Elea? It is obvious that Theaetetus’ reference at 183eand Sophist’s at 217c to 
Parmenides do not prove anything more than that they are post-Parmenides 
dialogues. Even Sophist’s reference at 216a to Theaetetus cannot mean more than 
that it is a later dialogue. The distance between these two dialogues can easily be 
shown by the obvious stylometric differences of Theaetetus on the one hand, and 
Sophist and Politicus on the other hand. While Sophist obviously belongs to the late 
period dialogues, Theaetetus, as Tarrant notes, 'approximates less to the style of the 
late dialogues as measured by stylometry than do the later books of the Republic' 
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(2000, 37). All the time references of the dialogues that yesterday we had such a 
discussion (Sophist 216a) or tomorrow will continue the other one (Theaetetus 210d) 
are, I think, only dramatic considerations and cannot be taken as exact chronological 
time distances.
33
 What these references can at most signify is that one dialogue has 
the other dialogue in mind either dramatically or philosophically by intending to 
continue the issue or resolvethe problems that had been drawn in those dialogues, as 
Sophist continues the issues of both Theaetetusand Parmenides II. To say that some 
times after writing Theaetetus, Plato decided to write another dialogue with some of 
the same characters especially Theaetetus and as its sequel, probably because he 
wanted to pursue the same problem,
34
 namely the problem of false belief, but this 
timewith a new ontological attitude, is quite more acceptable than Ryle’s suggestion 
(1966, 284) that Plato kept Sophist and Politicus in his shelf, a suggestion that was 
mostly based on the stylometric evidence. The generally agreed supposition that 
Theaetetus and Sophist are sequel or, as Ryle says,'a sort of sequel'
35
 (1939, 316) has 
even more problems. Theaetetus, firstly, is clearly a more close to the Socratic 
dialogues and is far less complicated than Sophist. Secondly, the method of collection 
and division to which Sophist is so bounded is almost absent in Theaetetus. The 
trilogy of dialogues promised at Sophist 217a3, thirdly, discussing sophist, stateman 
and philosopher starts with Sophistand not Theaetetus.
36
The ontological status of 
Sophist, fourthly and most importantly, is incomparable with that of Theaetetus that 
means they must belong to different periods. 
iv) Unlike Sophist and Republic that are inclined to distinguish between the objects of 
knowledge and belief, Theaetetus’ epistemological theories like the theories of Meno 
and Phaedo do not make distinction between the objects. In the analogy of block of 
wax, the difference of two men, one judging truly while the other falsely, are 
explained in their waxes (194c-e). Whereas the wax of the soul of one man is deep, 
abundant and smooth and hence the signs that are imprinted on are lasting, it is vice 
versa in another one: hard, shaggy, rugged and without depth which in not well 
imprintable and hence does not have distinct impressions making it liable to false 
judgment. The problem of false belief is to be treated here in this analogy by a 
subjective analysis trying to make the difference in the knower and not in the object 
of knowing. The analogy of Aviary is also the same in this respect: possessing 
(κεκτῆθαι) and having (ἔχειν) are distinct but not by their objects. It is the same 
object, a coat, that you have when you are wearing it, but you possess when though 
you have bought it, you are not wearing it now (197b8-10). A man who has birds in 
his aviary possesses them but he does not have them in his control and his hand 
unless he will (c1-5). So is the knowledge (197e). 
The birds are the same whether you have or possess them. What is different is 
the knower’s situation and not the known. It is exactly this kind of difference in the 
side of the knower that is to be taken as the explanation of the distinction of 
knowledge and true belief in Meno. True opinions are resembled to the statues of 
Daedalus that run away and escape if not tied down: true opinions become 
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knowledge (ἐπιστήμαι γίγονται) after being tied down (98a5-6) because 
knowledge differs from true opinion in being tied down (διαφέρει δεσμῷ 
ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης) (a7-8) which is itself done by the αἰτίας λογισμῷ (a3-
4). The fact that there is obviously no distinction between the objects of knowledge 
and true opinion in Theaetetus and Meno keeps them far from Sophist and Republic 
where the being of not being makes a third status, ἔοικος, which is taken as the 
object of opinion and distinct from the object of knowledge.  
The case of Cratylus is much the same as Theaetetus. The explanation 
presented there about the word doxa based on toxon meaning shooting a bow (420b), 
has a sign of its closeness to Theaetetus. Moreover, false speaking is still impossible 
(429c, 430c). So it can be said that while Theaetetus, Cratylus and Meno have 
distinguished between knowledge and true belief, they have not yet reached to its 
ontological correspondent.  
 
5. Parmenides II 
The second part of Parmenides that Palmer rightly calls 'the most puzzling and 
controversial text in the Platonic corpus' (1999, 148) is the only part in a dialogue 
that is totally different from its complementary part. Nowhere else can we make such 
an apparent distinction between parts of a dialogue. From Parmenides 137ff. we have 
a long chain of arguments hypothesizing various propositions regarding Parmenides’ 
"One" and again hypothesizing their opposites making an inescapable labyrinth. Its 
obvious differencefrom the first part of the dialogue makes the idea of Parmenides as 
an assembled dialogue more probable; an idea thathas been suggested by some 
commentators.
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i) The second part of the Parmenides is the initiating point of a new effort to save the 
theory of Forms. What Plato had tried to do in the epistemological wave was to 
provide solutions for the epistemological problem of Parmenides, but the problem of 
participation and TMare still fatal at the end of the epistemological wave. He had to 
start thus from the same point, i.e., Parmenides. This was not, nevertheless, his only 
reason to choose Parmenides as Socrates’ interlocutor to attach this new writing to 
the previously written dialogue with him but there was a more principal reason. He 
needed to go beyond Parmenides’ notion of One Being and this, I believe, was his 
main reason. What were to be reassessed was (1) Parmenides’principle of the tight 
attachment of "one" and "being"as the cause of his famous principle that 'being is 
one' and (2) Parmenideanunderstanding of "being" which was the cause of his 
principle of the impossibility of being of not being. In agreement with many 
commentators, I think ParmenidesII is the first step of Plato’s going beyond these 
two notions, and this can be observed as a major purpose of the dialogue. It is in this 
passage that Plato criticizes the relation of being and the same (162d) which can be 
considered both as the basis and thenecessary result of Parmenides’ principle, 'Being 
is one'. Thiscriticism that makes use of the notion of difference (143b) is only the 
preparatory step of his use of this notion in Sophist (255d ff.) by which the 
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Parmenidean principle of the impossibility of being of not being is rejected. If we 
read Parmenides II and Sophistas the sequel steps of an ontological project, we can 
see how the project of rejecting Parmenidean notions of One and Being leads to the 
notion of difference which itself is the basis of Plato’snew ontology in Sophist and 
Republic. This ontology has the solution of Parmenides I’s problems of participation 
and TMand, at the same time, the problem of false belief. The second part of 
theParmenidesmust then be dated after the epistemological wave and as the starting 
point of the ontological wave.Why can't we, one might ask, observe this ontological 
wave parallel to, or interwoven with, the epistemological wave? My main reason for 
the chronological order of two waves is that the dialogues of the epistemological 
wave, or at least Menoand Phaedo, are still unaware of the ontological wave’s 
solution.  
ii) The place of Parmenides II in OECD differs in two main regards from its place in 
the current chronologies: Theaetetus and Republic; while the contemporary 
chronologiesare accustomed to consider Parmenides, and consequently its second 
part, before Theaetetus and after Republic, we are suggesting its contrary in OECD. 
The change OECD implements regarding the place of these three dialogues is mostly 
because Parmenides II must ontologically be considered between Theaetetus and 
Republic. Theaetetus’ all epistemological efforts to answer the question 'what is 
knowledge?' (145a) with theories like knowledge is perception (151e ff.) or true 
judgment (187b) or true judgment plus an account (201d) besides the analogies of 
block of wax (191c-e), the Aviary (197bff.) and the analogy of knowledge to birdand 
the explanation of getting knowledge as hunting,all still are Plato’s epistemological 
efforts and do not think about the ontological solution. Regarding ontological issues, 
they are still faithful to Parmenidesand are not to challenge his principles as 
Parmenides II does.
38
 It is directly asserted at 180e-181a that Socrates got stuck 
between Parmenidean and Heraclitean theories and wants to put a fight and escape. 
This effort, however, does not bring it to the point of Parmenides II.At 
Theaetetus167a7-8we are being said that 'it is impossible to opine what is not (οὔτε 
γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι)' and at 189a10: 'opining not being is opining 
nothing (μὴ ὄν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει)'. 
In Parmenides II, we have not still gone out of Parmenides’dominance but the 
first step is taken. At 160e, we are encountered with the necessity of dealing with not 
being with some adjectives like "this" or "that" and so on. Though still unable to be, 
not being must necessarily partake of many things: 
 
The One indeed cannot be, if it is not, but it is necessary that nothing prevent it 
from partaking of many things.  (160e7-161a1) 
 
The whole of the sophisticated arguments of Parmenides II can show how 
much the Parmenides’ understanding of being is problematic. What is said, for 
instance, at 162a can be a good example: If the one -which is not- is to be not being, 
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it must have being a not-being as a bond in regard to its not-being, just as what is 
must have not-being what is not, if it is to be completely. Although the Parmenidean 
being is not overpassed in Parmenides II, these discussion shows that it is not 
accepted as before. Theaetetus’ attention to the problem of Parmenidean being is 
confined to its contradiction with Heraclitean notion of flux. This understanding, I 
believe, is much more elementary than Parmenides II’s attention to the problems 
arisen from Parmenides’ understanding of the concept of being. If our arguments are 
sound, Parmenides II cannot be prior to Theaetetus because of its ontological status. 
This status, on the contrary, makes it prior to Sophist and Republic. The incomplete 
achievement to the being of not being in Parmenides II must antecedate its full 
achievement in Sophist and its implementation in Repubic. 
iii) Being dominant in Sophist and Politicus and absent from Theatetus, the method 
of collection and division has a predominant role in the second part of Parmenides
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while cannot be seen in the first part of this dialogue. This is fully consistent with 
OECD’s arrangement. While the first part of Parmenides and the Theaetetus are 
dated as prior to the dialogues of the epistemological wave, all unaware of the 
method of collection and division, the second part of Parmenides, the Sophist and 
Politicusare engaged with this new method. 
iv) Almost all the stylometric evidences are pro the antecedent date of Parmenides 
regarding Republic. 'In sofar as stylometry suggests anything', Tarrant says,'it 
strongly suggests that both works [i.e. Theaetetus and Parmenides] were begun far 
earlier than the Republic was finished' (2000, 141). 
 
6. Republic and Laws 
The place of the Republic is the most confusing in the arrangement of the 
dialogues
40
.We have the following evidences: 
a) Based on ontological features, it must be dated after SophistandParmenidesII. 
b) Because of its ontological solution of the problems of participation and TM, it 
must be dated after Parmenides I.
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c) Based on Aristotle’s testimony (Politics, II, 6), it is prior to Laws. 
d) Laws is unaware of philosopher-king theory of Repulic which implies that its place 
after the final version of Republic might be problematic.
42
 
e) Stylometric evidences strongly suggest that Sophist, Politicus, Timaieus, Critias 
and Philebus belong to the same period of Laws. 
While the ontological evidences, (a) and (b), ask us to consider Republic after 
Sophist and Parmenides, the political evidences, (c)
43
 and (d), alongside the 
stylometric evidences (e), tells that it must be prior to the so called late dialogues.The 
only solution is what has been suggested by somescholars that Republic is not a 
simple dialogue but a later composition of some dialogues. Except 
RepublicIitsseparation and being early is a more accepted fact, the passage 473-571is 
alsoa later attachment. Our reasons for its attachment are as follows. 
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i) After first book’saporetic ending like a Socratic dialogue, being unable to find 
what justice is, the second book starts by Socrates’statement that: 'when I said this 
[referring to his last sentences in the first book, namely that he could not find what 
justice is and soon], I thought I had done with the discussion, but it turned out to have 
been only a prelude' (357a). The discussion continues with the goodness or badness 
of injustice pursuing the first book’s discussion. The search of finding individual 
justice transfers to a search for justice in a city by Socrates’ suggestion that they 
might be more successful to find it if they search it in a larger thing, a city (368d), 
which leads them to construct a city in order to find justice there. This is the directing 
line of the argument whichtends to be exclusively treating with many political issues 
about all the details of constructing a city. After more than 65 Stephanus pages, we 
are given the result of this investigation of justice in the city, the larger object of 
investigation,in the middle of the fourth book (433). The discussants then try to find 
the justice in the individual by applying the result they got fromtheir investigation of 
justice in the city (434e ff.). This leads to the tripartite structure ofthe soul based on 
the structure of the city and finally to the result that the justice in an individual is just 
the same as it was in a city, that is, when each of its parts does its own work (441d 
ff.). They then look for injustice (444a ff.) and try to answer if justice is profitable or 
not (444e ff.) which leads itself to the comparison between types of souls and types 
of political constitutions (448c ff.).This topic is, however, postponed because of 
Polemarchus’demand for the explanation of what was said before, namely the 
question that how possessions can be held in common, which is at the very beginning 
of the fifth Book (449a). This topic, then, runs the discussion and brings some 
marginal discussions by 471d where the question of possibility of such an ideal city 
arises. In his first answer to the problem, Plato points to the fact that what he had 
drawn out was only a theoretical model that does not need to be proved as a possible 
city (472).I think this can be the end of the story of the Ideal State that had been 
started from the beginning of the second Book. 
What is said from 473c on is completely a new project and, I think, is attached 
to the Ideal State (357-472). The cities we have, Socrates says, is able to make the 
ideal state possible if the 'greatest wave' can be passed. This greatest wave is nothing 
but the theory of philosopher-king. Socrates is afraid of being ridiculed and laughed 
because of the theory (473c7-9) which shows both its importance and 
Socrates’understandable hesitation about it. Socrates’ own statement can approve 
this: 
 
Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading 
men genuinely and adequately philosophize …Glaucon!cities will have no rest 
from evils nor, I think, will the human race. And, until this happens, the 
constitution we have been describing in theory will never be born to the fullest 
extent possible or see the light of the sun. It is because I saw how very 
paradoxical this statement would be that I hesitated to make it for so long… 
(473c11-e4)
44
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 Although this long time hesitation may hint that what we are being said is 
something that had been doubted to be written or published, we are not going to rely 
only on this. What happens after this and its overall difference from Ideal State can 
be more decisive. The theory of philosopher-king brings forth the question that: who 
are the true philosophers? (475e3) This question turns the discussion to a discussion 
of the philosopher from 473c on. Besides the fact that all of these pages are 
discussing onto-epistemological issues thatare related to the subject of philosopher, 
"philosopher" is itself the subject of the discussions. The question of "who are the 
philosophers?" leads to the passage (476e-479e)  that distinguishes knowledge as 
what is set over being from opinion as what is set over what both is and is not. As the 
lovers of the objects of knowledge, i.e., what is, philosophers are distinct from the 
lovers of sights and soundswho love the objects of opinion (479e-484a). Philosophers 
are those who are able to grasp what the lovers of sights and sounds are not able, 
namely, what is always the same (484b). It is the nature (φύσιν) of philosopher 
which is the subject of inquiry (485a5, at 485a10: φιλοσόφωνφύσεων) and is 
described at 492a1-5 and is again connected with things themselves at 493ef.. 
Socrates then says that the philosophic nature is altered in the constitutions of his 
time and thus links the discussion of philosopher to that of the Ideal State (497b ff.) 
and concludes that philosophers are the best guardians of the city (503b) andthey 
must exercise in many subjects (503e) most importantly the Form of the Good (504e-
505a). This leads to the allegories of Sun, Line and Cave in the sixth and seventh 
books. After a full discussion of the way guardians must be brought about with 
different sciences in their carears to become philosophers, those who survived all the 
tests and saw the Form of the Good can order the city and become the philosopher-
kings (540a f.). It is the end of the search for philolopherand the way the philosopher 
must be brought about in the city and also the end of the seventh book (541b). 
Therefore, it can be said that the passage from the last pages of book V to the end of 
book VII, i. e., 473c-541b, has the philosopher as its subject. 
In addition to the unity of this passage of which we tried to provide a very short 
and thus insufficient review, what makes its attachment to the Ideal State more 
probable is that this discussion of philosopher is in the middle of the discussion of 
common possession in the city; a discussion that had been started from the beginning 
of fifth book (449) and continued till 471d where the problem of the possibility of the 
ideal state directs the discussion to the topic of the philosopher at 473c. By the end of 
the discussion about philosopher, we immediately fall into the same discussion at the 
very beginning of book VIII, even without any introduction or a linking paragraph: 
 
Well, then, Glaucon, we've agreed to the following: If a city is to achieve the 
height of good government, wives must be in common, children and all their 
education must be in common… (453a1f.) 
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After his long diversion from the previous topic, Socrates needs the beginning 
topic to be recalled and Glaucon, reminding the topic, says: 'you were talking as you 
had completed the description of the city' (543c7-8). If I am right in my consideration 
of the part we distinguished as an attachment, having in mind its topic, philosopher, 
and its place in OECD, after Sophist and Politicus, the first probability will be that 
this later attachment is so similar in its topic as well as its order, to the unwritten third 
part of the trilogy of sophist, statesman and philosopher that though had been 
promised at Sophist 217a3, has never been published.This motivated me to suggest 
that this passage that I cut up from the Republic might be the Philosophos, the third 
part of the trilogy.Plato never published the third part maybe because he was afraid, 
as he himself says, of its theme, namely that philosophers must be the kings, besides 
the fact that hegot stuck in another project and thus tried to reshape what he had in 
mind, or maybe even had somehow written, as the third part of the trilogy and 
emplace it in the larger plan of Republic.In her book, Philosophos: Plato’s Missing 
Dialogue (2012), Gill believes that based on the fact that it is not included in the 
ancient survived list of Plato’s dialogues, 'we can be fairly sure that the dialogue was 
not written and lost' (p.1). She thinks that Plato left it on purpose and 'deliberately 
withholds' it to stimulate his audience to combine the pieces about the subject in the 
other dialogues. Focusing on Parmenides, Theaetetus and Sophist, she does not let, of 
course, Republic to take part in this combining because, based on SCD Republic must 
be prior toall of them. 
OECD’s arrangement of the ontological and political waves can explain why 
Plato who was thinking of that trilogy fell into the political wave.Suppose that at the 
time of composing Sophist, Plato was thinking that after writing about it, he will 
write a dialogue about statesman and then another one about philosopher as the 
culmination of the trilogy. It is not strange to imagine that this path was deviated to a 
political inquiry when he became engaged with political issues in Politicus. Instead 
of continuing it with a dialogue about philosopher, he became thus busy with Ideal 
State and Laws. Maybe it was only after Timaeus and with the use of all the 
hierarchical models he had discovered from Ideal State onward that he decided to 
assemble what he had in mind, or maybe in his shelf (!), about philosopher with his 
search for the Ideal State and based on the question of 'what is justice?' in Republic 
I,which had been composed long time ago.
45
 If I am right in this suggestion, both the 
posterior date of the Philosophosand its difference from Ideal State can be more 
acceptable.  
ii) The epistemological difference between the Philosophos and Ideal State also 
worths remarking. What is said in the third book at 402b, that to know the copy, 
knowledge of original is necessary, seems prior to and even inconsistent, though not 
necessarily, with what is said in the sixth book and in the theory of hypothesis by 
which one goes upside from copy to original without having the knowledge of the 
original. The difference of 473-571 from the other passages of Republicand specially 
Ideal Stateis also clear from its mostly metaphysicalcontent that is definitely 
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separable from its previous passage dealing exclusively with political issues. This 
content is the very one which we considered as the evidence of Republic’s being later 
than Parmenides II, Sophist andTimaeus. Therefore, if we accept that Republic II-X 
has at least two assembled parts, we will become able to manage the confusion arisen 
from the arrangement of Republic and Laws. It is the political part of Republic, Ideal 
state, which is prior to Laws and is referred there and, probably, was in Aristotle’s 
mind
46
 when said that Lawsis after Republic.The later date of the Philosophos, the 
very passage the idea of philosopher-king is drawn out there can also suggest a 
solution to the problem of Law’s negligence of the philosopher-king doctrine that had 
surprised commentators.  
iii) 'Before stylometry', as Prior asserts, 'almost all scholars would have placed the 
Republic after the Sophist' (1985, 168). This was due to the stylometric evidences 
that Republicis dated now in SCD as middle and prior to many dialogues. 
Nonetheless, the assembled character of Republic suggests a sound solution for the 
biggest problematic decision of OECD regarding stylometric evidences.   Suppose 
that Plato who had composed the first book of Republic much earlier and most 
probably in his early period of writing and the Ideal State in another time, now 
decides to compose the Republic which includes not only those dialogues but what 
was in his mind or even written, the Philosophos, as the third part of the trilogy. It is 
not then of a shock to say that since he wanted to rewritethem as the continuation of 
Republic I, he tried to keep a unified style as for as possible.Lutoslavski also 
approves a later date for the books VI and VII of Republic.
47
 
 
7. Timaeus 
By the suggestion of the distinction of the Philosophos from the Ideal State, the 
date OECD considered for Timaeus becomes more acceptable. The passage in 
Timaeus (17a, 18b) which has always been taken as referring to Republic,is 
indeedreferring to Ideal State. This helps us consider it as a prior dialogue to 
Republic because it seems thatits ontological statusindicates its place between 
Sophistand Philosophos.
48
Owen’s main reasons for dating Timaeus after Republic 
and before Politicus (1998, 260-261) are these: 
a) The opening of the dialogue (17a) refers to a dialogue that had occurred the 
previous day that most probably is Republic.  
b) At Timaeus 18b the idea that guardians must have no gold or silver or any private 
property refers to Republic417a and 547b-548b.  
c) The Politicus (at 292a, c and 293a, c-d) insists four times (?) that whether the ruler 
has any wealth is completely irrelevant to the quality of his governance. Owen thinks 
that this is said as a novel doctrine.  
d) The system of marriage of the guardians in Republic (457c-465c) echoed in 
Timaeus (18c-d) is abandoned in Politicus (310c-311c). 
These evidences can lead to another arrangement between the dialogues if we 
accept Republic II-Xas having two parts, the Ideal State and the Philosophos: (a) and 
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(b) are clearly referring to the Ideal State and not to the Philosophos.Moreover, not 
only (c) and (d) are not problematic regarding OECD’s arrangement but they can 
even be supportive because the more elementary status of Politicus’ political 
discussion
49
 regarding Ideal State is thoroughly consistent with OECD’s later date for 
Ideal State and Republic. Unlike Owen, I think what is said about the rulers’ 
wealth(293c8-d2)can be more of an evidenceapproving the priority of 
Politicus’theory than presenting a new theory against the past theory.Unlike Owen 
who thinks that this is a novel doctrine, I think it might equally mean that Plato is not 
yet achieved to his more complicated theory of propertyless rulers. Moreover, that 
Plato does not speak in Politicus of the marriage of the guardians can similarlybeout 
of the fact thatPoliticus is still unaware of the idea. Owen, however, agrees that 
neither Timaeus nor Critias seem to know anything about Republic’s doctrine that 'a 
state may be saved by the supremacy not of immutable laws but of an ἀνήρ 
φρόνιμος above the law' (1998, 264).Owen and Nicholas P. White (1976, 91) are 
right that Timaeus is closer to Republic than the late dialogues
50
 but Cherniss is also 
right that it is later than Parmenides. 
 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1
Thesleff says that in spite of the fact that the only evidence from which we can infer the 
chronology is the internal evidence, 'the value of such evidence is open to the general 
criticism that many, if not all, may have been re-written' (1989, 7). 'There is no reason', he 
continues, 'to suppose that Plato left his writing in exactly the same state in which they 
were first composed'. (ibid) 
2
 There are some issues about Plato’s life that can overally change any chronological order. 
What Grombie calls 'the most critical event' (1969, 363) in Plato’s life, namely his 
probable being prosecuted for defamation and being forbidden to teach at 372 can be one 
of these issues.  
3
 E.g. Diognes Laertius (Lives, III, 37), Olympiodorus (Prol. VI, 24) 
4
 This kind of naming is also compatible with Plato’s own way of theorizing as he always 
makes use of entangible things as models trying to explain complicated matters. 
5
By Parmenides I, I mean the first part of the dialogue which is discussing the problems of 
Socrates’ theory of Forms and lasts till 137. Parmenides II consists the part from 137 to 
the end of the dialogue where Parmenides’ One is being discussed. 
6
The mentions of the theory in Philebus (342b) and Laws (732b) appear to be, as Sayre 
(2005, 193) notes, 'entirely removed' from the sense it had before. I am not convinced 
with Kahn’s (1996, 367) appealing to Politicus 277d and Timaeus 41e-42d as the 
passages in which the theory is alluded or implied. 
7
 Kahn (1996, 373) points to some evidences of Phaedrus’ referring to Republic (cf. 
Hackforth (1952, 3-7). Irwin believes that Phaedrus must be considered as a 'revision' or 
'development' of the views of both Republic and Symposium and not an anticipation of 
them (1995, 12). 
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8
 Being certain about Symposium’s posterior date, Moore asserts that while writing 
Symposium, Plato must have 'firmly' had Phaedrus in mind. Mostly based on Phaedrus’ 
more sophisticated logic represented in its method of collection and division, Dillon 
(1973) argues against him. 
9
  By so calling them, I do not mean, of course, that they are the real dialogues of historical 
Socrates. 
10
Cf. Fine, 2003, 29 
11
The relation of Cratylus and Theaetetus is a Problem with which the current chronologies 
do not know what to do (cf. Runciman, 1962, 2). While Cratylus looks close to the early 
dialogues, it has some unignorable similarities to Theaetetus, which is considered far from 
the early and after the middle period dialogues. While OECD resolves this problem easily 
considering Theaetetus as early, about the order between Theaetetus and Cratylus I cannot 
be certain at all since there cannot be found any certain ontological or epistemological 
priority between them. All that can be said is that they are close to each other as some of 
their main themes, especially the problems of flux, Protagoras’ relativism and false belief 
might bring to mind. Never holding a 'confident opinion', Runciman, however, dates 
Cratylus 'somewhere before' Theaetetus (ibid). 
12
Gorgiasmentions the distinction of knowledge and true opinion without discussing it, a 
distinction proved in Theaetetus and used in Meno. While it is accepted that there can be 
false conviction besides true conviction (πίστις ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής) (454d5), false 
knowledge (ἐπιστήμη…ψευδὴς) (d6-7) is strongly prohibited. Gorgias accepts the first 
simply by saying Ναί and rejects the second strongly by saying Οὐδαμῶς.It shows, 
though not strongly, that they might have been composed after Theaetetusand before 
Meno. While, on the other hand, the problem of teachability of virtue seems to indicate 
that both Gorgias and Protagoras may belong to the period of Meno, there might be some 
indications of their priority. I found Jane M. Day’s (1994 cf. 10) points about the priority 
ofProtagoras tenable though maybe I am not as certain as she appears to be. She dates 
Gorgias later than Protagoras and closer to Meno. 
13
 As it will be discussed in detail, what I call as an independent dialogue is nothing but 
Republic 473-541 where the philosopher is the subject of discussion.  
14
 The epistemological aspect of the problem had been resolved by the distinction of 
knowledge and true belief in the epistemological wave. 
15
 That the books II-V of the Republic is mostly the same as the famous Ideal State has been 
suggested before. Cf., e.g., Ryle (1966) 
16
Prior (1985, 9) insists that the theory of Forms is 'as explicitly present' in Euthyphro as it is 
in Phaedo and Republic. 
17Cornford’s suggestion that the aim of the dialogue is to examine and reject the experimental 
approach to knowledge is not compatible with the place he and others dedicate to 
Theaetetus. It is not a suitable time, to reject the experimental approach after Meno, 
Phaedo and Republic since they are already out of the approach and need no rejection. 
18
That the first part of Parmenides has the appearance of a work complete in itself,  is 
something can hardly be deniedeven by those scholars, like Meinwald, who do not believe 
it as distinct from the second part and written at a different time (1991, 5-6). 
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19
Referring to Euthyphro (5d) and Hippias Major (300a-b), Allen  notes that the Forms in the 
early dialogues are universal, which is the same (ταὐτόν), common (κοινὸν) in them and 
something identical (τιτὸαὺτό) in all its cases (2013, 69-70). 
20
In his second letter (314c3-4), Plato asserts that his written works are not the works of Plato 
but of a Socrates 'made fair and young (καλοῦκαὶ νέουγεγονότος)'. This younghood 
must of course be considered as compared to the reral Socrates who was adult and old 
and, thus, does not mean as young as is represented in Parmenides. 
21
 Thinking that there is a 'partial or relative' identification of universals and paradigms, 
Gerson (1998, 138) criticizes their complete distinction.  
22
He even points that appealing to the model of original-copy cannot be helpful to avoid SP 
while there are some 'independent reasons' that Plato was committed to it (White, 1977, 
211). 
23
Allen (1997, 106) mentions Phaedo 74b-75d as an evidence for the theory of paradigm in 
this dialogue. About Republic V, which White thinks is not committed to the theory, I am 
not convinced since I think there are not enough about the case in this book. White brings 
the use of μετέχεινorκοινωνίαor the use of πράγματαandμετέχοντα as evidence 
(1977, 201-2) which, I think, prove nothing.   
24
Annas mentions Phaedo 74e (besides Republic, Euthyphro and Theaetetus (176e ?)) as one 
of the places in which Forms are considered as paradigms (1974, 278, n.50). Although it 
might be close to paradigm-based understanding of Forms, I am not certain about taking it 
so. That Form is something that participants want to be like (βούλεται μὲν τουτο ... 
εἶναι οἷον) but fall short, cannot necessarily mean that the Form is a paradigm here. 
Though the relation of Forms and participants in Phaedo might be directed towards what 
it will be in Republic, I do not think that we are allowed to assume them the 
same.Regarding the mention of paradigm in Euthyphro 6e the best suggestion is, I think, 
that it is not, as Fujisawa (1974, 43) says, 'a case of genuine paradigmatism we find in 
later dialogues' (cf.Lutoslawski 1897, 199-200). 
25
 Listing the anamnesis in Meno, the method of hypothesis in Phaedo and the non-
hypothetical principle in Republic as three answers to the question of the knowledge of 
the Forms, Sayre reasonably thinks that the first one is the simplest. (2005, 299) 
26
It is generally agreed that some uses of εἴδος or ἰδέαin Theaetetus (e.g., 184d3, 203c6, 
203e4, 204a1, 205d4-5) are not in the same technical sense.  
27
Besides Meno 72b-c, 75a can also correctly be taken as a reference to the theory though the 
word εἶδος at 72c7 is not repeated here again. These do not, nonetheless, refuse Fine’s 
correct assertion that the theory of Forms is 'muted' in Meno (2003, 44). 
28
 There are some other passages where Plato puts question mark in front of the existence of 
Forms. Cf. e.g. Phaedo 65d, 74a, 76e-77a, Protagoras 330c, Cratulus 439c-d, Timaeus 
51b-c. 
29
 Nicholas P. White, on the contrary, thinks that in the early dialogues Plato talks 'as if' he 
believed in Forms (1976, 6). 
30
 Vlastos (1991, 58f.) points to this difference between so-called early and middle dialogues. 
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31
 Kahn argues that we have no reason that Aristotle had any evidence for the development of 
Plato’s thought in his early period (1996, 81) especially if we observe that the date of 
Aristotle’s arriving at the Academy is when Plato was at least sixty years old. 
32
 In spite of all these points, Euthydemus’ way of talking about dialecticians at 290c sounds 
surprisingly like Republic.  
33
The allusions to the historical events that occur occasionally in some dialogues can be 
interpreted merely as dramatic or, as Mackey says, 'later interpolations' using past events 
(1928, 11). As Maccabe (2008, 96) points out, even the dialogues making vigorous claims 
to historicity 'bear the marks of fiction'. The writer of the dialogues, like a play writer, 
designs the scene, chooses the most suitable location and time and to make it appear more 
real, uses some real events of that time and location. It cannot be denied that the dramatic 
features of the dialogues are not negligible for Plato. We will not thus rely on the 
allusions to the historical events. 
34
Thinking that the reappearance of Theaetetus in Sophist is a 'clear reminder of continuity' of 
the same project (2013, 94), Kahn accepts that 'a considerable lapse of time' might have 
occurred between their composition. 
35
He thinks that the two dialogues were composed after the Parmenides 'as a whole' (1939, 
316-317). 
36
 Gill’s suggestion (2012, 1) of a tetralogy opening with Theaetetus is not tenable. Besides 
the cross references of which we discussed above, I cannot understand how she can take 
the similarity of characters as an evidence whereas the difference of Theaetetus with those 
two in this respect is obvious enough. The change of Socrates as the main speaker in 
Theaetetus to a visitor from Elea as the leading character in the other two dialogues does 
not let us agree with her. Suppose we accept that the change of Socrates with a visitor 
from Elea in Sophist might be related to the duty of the dialogue in criticizing 
Parmenides: to guarantee, as Kahn (2013, 94) suggest, 'an atmosphere of intellectual 
sympathy'. What then about Politicus? Gill thinks, however, that 'Plato substantially 
revised an earlier version of the Theaetetus to fit into a series with the Sophist and 
Statesman' (p.3, n. 8). 
37
 Ryle, for example, thinks that these two parts were composed at 'considerably' different 
dates (1966, 216). Also cf. Thesleff (1989, 19) and Tarrant (2000, 140-141) 
38
There is an explicit shift from epistemology to ontology at 188c-d saying that perhaps the 
problem of false belief is better to be dealt with the notions of being and not being rather 
than knowing and not knowing which immediately leads to the problem of the 
impossibility of thinking about not being (188d ff.). 
39
Cf. Turnball, 1998, especially pages 41 and 173.  
40
Nails (1998, 174) notes: 'We have perhaps less hope of accurately dating the Republic than 
of any other dialogue in the corpus'. Cherniss’ phrases like 'orthodox opinion' (1998, 293) 
about the place of Republic is interesting. 
41I am not convinced with Thesleff’s note that the opening of the Parmenides suggests that 
the Republic was finished at the time. He accepts, however, that the book X and 'some 
passages' in the earlier books might have been added later (1989, 19). 
42
Moreover, as Lane (2006, 185) mentions, the book IX of the Laws implicitly suggests that 
the city drawn out in this dialogue is a second-best city as comparing not to the city of 
Republic but to that of the Politicus. 
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43
 That Aristotle’s evidence is in a political text discussing political issues might allow us to 
take it more as political evidence though it is not a political evidence but a chronological 
one. 
44
 See also: 499a 
45
Aristotle’ statement in Politics II 1264b39 that Socrates filled upthe Republic with 
'extraneous discourses' can be noteworthy. Reminding that the 'three résumés of the 
original Ideal State' shows that it contained nothing about justice, theological fables or the 
dispensability of Homer, dialectic and so on, Ryle adds that our version of the Republic 
was not assembled until Plato returned from Sicily (1966, 244-245). 
46
That Aristotel tells this in a political passage (Politics II, 6) makes this more probable. 
However, the reason can simply be the date of Law’s publication which is surely later 
than Republic. 
47
There are some other reasons that might be taken as evidence for the lateness of the 
Philosophos like its Pythagorean spirit, its discussion of the Good that seems to be the 
closest passage among Plato’s dialogues to his famous lecture 'On the Good' and also 
Philebus. 
48
Ryle notes that the discussion of pleasure at Republic 583b 'presupposes' and advances 'a 
long way beyond' Timaeus (1966, 249). 
49
Lane (2006, 180) speaks of two points in Politicus that went unnoticed in Republic; (1) the 
knowledge of the Good 'in time' (2) which must be made authoritative over the 
requirements of fixed laws. These, however, cannot prove anything about the order of the 
dialogues. 
50
Rickless also prefers to agree with Owen mostly because of the theory of Forms in Timaeus 
which resembles that of Republic (2007, 8). 
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